For Warbrick, the tension between the centralising and decentralising characteristics of the Convention system provided insight into its 'federal' qualities, and its ability to effectively accommodate national interests and initiatives into an overarching multijurisdictional scheme for the protection of individual rights. In the context of the relationships between the European Court of Human Rights and national authorities within the UK, the growing perception of a power imbalance -of an inability of the Court and Convention to accommodate such difference -animates deliberations over a UK Bill of Rights. The consequences of the perceived trend towards centralisation have been to unsettle the balance between state and centralised authority that is inherent in the Convention system to the extent that -in the context of current UK political discourse at least -it is questionable whether the narrative of the Convention's architecture as 'subsidiary to the national systems' 9 retains widespread credibility. These debates have prompted calls for revision of both the internal and external dimensions of the UK/Strasbourg relationship. As to the external, it has become commonplace for the European Court of Human Rights to be accused of 1. The suggestion that there should be no national authority to limit or reduce rights as defined by the Strasbourg court (ie in those cases where the right in question might be said to enjoy a clearly-defined and irreducible minimum);
2. In determining the content of the right in question, the Strasbourg court finds a 'strong majority practice' across its jurisdiction; 3. A concern that the 'localization' of rights will result in unjustifiable differences in treatment as between the states.
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Warbrick was careful to observe that -aside from the first argument -the European Court had developed no theory that made the application of any of the 'federal' contentions mandatory. 44 But each of these characteristics remains of relevance, and speaks to the (centralised) interpretative function of the Court in articulating the meaning of the Convention rights.
It is a core element of the Court's role to articulate the minimum standards required by the Convention, the level of protection that should be common across each of the member states. 12 whether a 'European consensus' can be seen to exist, or can be seen to be emergent. 45 The 'centralising' consequences of this exercise, for those states that can be said to be a part of the emerging consensus, are rather less pronounced than for those whose protections fall below the level set by the majority. The visible function of the Court is therefore to adjudicate the complaints of individuals alleging interference with their rights at the hands of the state or its agents, but in doing so it must also seek to articulate the minimum level of protection that should be afforded to those rights across the Convention system. The individual complaint mechanism is the means by which the concurrent purpose of the Convention -the administration of 'constitutional justice' through the articulation of minimum standards of compliance in response to serious defects at the national level -is realised. 
The Domestic Amplification of the Convention Jurisprudence
Any assessment of the federal character of the UK/Strasbourg relationship is complicated by the fact that one of the core centralising arguments in the case for a UK Bill of Rights is the consequence of a legislative exercise in decentralisation taken by the UK Parliament. It has become trite to recall that the purpose of enacting the Human Rights Act 1998 was to 'bring rights home', but the problem to which the Act was the proposed solution was that the Convention rights were seen as being both practically and jurisprudentially alien. The Act therefore sought to deliver on the promises to make rights accessible to litigants in domestic courts -saving the delays and costs associated with making an application to the Strasbourg court -and to bring the Convention rights 'much more fully into the jurisprudence of the courts throughout the United Kingdom' so that they might be 'more subtly and powerfully woven into our law.' 73 The 1998 Act therefore was, and remains, an essentially prosubsidiarity measure. This state-led exercise in decentralisation has, however, given rise to a heightened perception of central control held by the Strasbourg court.
In adjudication under the Human Rights Act, the centralising interpretative Conscious of current controversy, Judge Mahoney has reiterated that the 'object of the Convention system, unlike that of the legal order of the European Union, is not to bring about uniformity of national law or rigorously uniform implementation of the internationally accepted engagements (that is, the guaranteed rights and freedoms) in each one of the participating states.' 88 It follows that the Court grants not only a margin of appreciation but also does not -as noted aboveprescribe specific responses, allowing states the scope to determine the most appropriate mechanism by which the Convention's minimum standards might be secured within the jurisdiction in question. The European Court itself has, in a similar vein, taken the opportunity to reject the suggestion that it is in the process of attempting to homogenise the legal and political systems of the member states:
There [are] a wealth of differences, inter alia, in the historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each contracting state to mould into its own democratic vision. 
24
In recognition of this fact (which also speaks to the role of the Court as a body which reviews domestic compliance rather than by which domestic decisions might be overturned on appeal), it has also -and perhaps belatedly -been recognised by the expression, and therefore typically an area in which any margin of appreciation would be relatively narrowly drawn 101 -the Court thoroughly considered the process by which the UK's challenged ban on political advertising had been enacted (and subsequently found to be compatible with the requirements of Article 10 in domestic adjudication 102 ). The Strasbourg court noted that:
The prohibition was … the culmination of an exceptional examination by
Parliamentary bodies of the cultural, political and legal aspects of the prohibition as part of the broader regulatory system governing broadcasted public interest expression in the United Kingdom, and all bodies found the prohibition to have been a necessary interference with art.10 rights.
[…]
The proportionality of the prohibition was, nonetheless, debated in some detail before the High Court and the House of Lords … both levels endorsed the objective of the prohibition as well as the rationale of the legislative choices which defined its particular scope and each concluded that it was a necessary and proportionate interference with the applicant's rights under art.10 of the Convention.
The Court, for its part, attaches considerable weight to these exacting and pertinent reviews, by both parliamentary and judicial bodies, of the complex regulatory regime governing political broadcasting in the United Kingdom, and to their view that the general measure was necessary to prevent the distortion of crucial public interest debates and, thereby, the undermining of the democratic process. 103 The European Court of Human Rights found that national authorities were 'best placed' to determine what should be regarded as a 'country specific and complex assessment' of the balance to be struck.
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Affording weight to the considered judgment of a national legislature (and/or courts) could be said to illustrate in practice that '[s]ubsidiarity is at the very heart of the Convention' and is demonstrative that the European Court is 'intended to be subsidiary to the national systems'. 105 Instead of affording a concession to national authorities, the European Court demonstrates that the decision-making process of the domestic legislature will be material, and that decisions adopted following 'extensive debate by the democratically elected representatives', 106 or which can be shown to be 'the culmination of … detailed examination of the social, ethical and legal implications of developments' 107 may be more likely to fall within any margin of appreciation afforded by the Court.
Embedding structural subsidiarity
The In the sphere of social and economic policy … the court will generally respect the legislature's policy choice unless it is 'manifestly without legal foundation.' Moreover, the Court has recognised the 'special weight' to be accorded to the domestic policy-maker in matters of general policy on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ. Court are more carefully demarcated and policed. As such, it is a defensive step towards a dualised model of federal relationship which seeks to underscore the autonomy of the member state at the expense of the Convention's animating sense of pan-European co-operation.
